This chapter surveys the existing empirical literature on whether capital punishment deters crime. I briefl y discuss standard economic theory's predictions of capital punishment's impact on crime and provide a concise history of the death penalty in the United States. Then I extensively review both the early and recent empirical literature testing the relationship between capital punishment and crime. Most recent empirical studies of capital punishment fi nd evidence supporting the deterrence hypothesis. However, a few recent studies have raised questions about the sensitivity of some of the previous results. Other recent research also shows that deterrence does not occur in many states and for many types of executions. Indeed, in a substantial number of states, executions may instead increase crime.
Introduction
This chapter surveys the existing empirical literature on whether capital punishment deters crime. I briefl y discuss standard economic theory's predictions of capital punishment's impact on crime and provide a concise history of the death penalty in the United States. Then I extensively review both the early and recent empirical literature testing the relationship between capital punishment and crime. Most recent empirical studies of capital punishment fi nd evidence supporting the deterrence hypothesis. However, a few recent studies have raised questions about the sensitivity of some of the previous results. Other recent research also shows that deterrence does not occur in many states and for many types of executions. Indeed, in a substantial number of states, executions may instead increase crime.
Although the heated debate over capital punishment raises many moral, legal, and religious issues, economists' greatest contribution has been an extensive analysis of whether capital punishment deters crime. This chapter reviews the growing empirical literature that examines this deterrent eff ect.
Because almost all Western industrialized nations have abolished capital punishment, the recent empirical literature focuses exclusively on capital punishment's eff ect in the United States.
1 In this chapter, I briefl y discuss theoretical predictions of capital punishment's impact on crime, provide a concise history of the death penalty in the US, and review both the early and recent empirical literature.
Theoretical predictions
According to standard economic theory, the possibility of being executed is one of many potential costs that criminals consider when they are deciding whether to engage in crime. When the use of capital punishment 1 There are a few early studies of the deterrent eff ect in other countries. For example, Wolpin (1978) found evidence of deterrence in England. Avio (1979) found no evidence of a deterrent eff ect in Canada, but Layson (1983) found evidence of deterrence in Canada.
increases, the costs of committing murder increase, and, according to the theory, some potential criminals will refrain from committing murder.
Although the basic theory is straightforward, three alternate theories suggest that, instead, capital punishment may have no eff ect on crime, or may even cause crime to increase. First, executions are rare. In 2006, there were 16,692 homicides, but only 60 executions. Because recent literature suggests that many individuals treat events with low probability as having a zero probability (Cooter and Ulen 2004, p. 351) , executions might be expected to have little impact on crime. On the other hand, the substantial publicity surrounding many executions may exaggerate criminals' perceptions of the probability of being executed.
Second, for some criminals, the existence of state-sanctioned executions may reduce the moral aversion or social stigma associated with committing a murder. By reducing the moral and social costs of committing murders, executions may cause some criminals to murder more people than they would otherwise. This possibility has been called capital punishment's 'brutalization eff ect' (Bowers and Pierce, 1975; Shepherd, 2005) .
Third, the threat of execution may induce some criminals to commit more murders in order to avoid being executed. A person who has already committed a murder that would subject him to execution may have an incentive to murder potential witnesses who could provide incriminating evidence against him and increase the likelihood of a death sentence.
Whether capital punishment deters murder is ultimately an empirical question.
History of the death penalty
In order to provide a context for my discussion of the empirical studies, I now briefl y discuss the history of the death penalty in the United States in the twentieth century.
During the fi rst half of the twentieth century, executions were frequent. For example, more executions occurred during the 1930s than in any other decade in American history: an average of 167 executions each year. However, over the next few decades, various social forces combined to reduce capital punishment's use. Two primary concerns were, fi rst, that capital punishment was applied in a racially discriminatory way and, second, that its application was arbitrary. Echoing these concerns, the US Supreme Court declared current capital statutes unconstitutional in three cases in 1972: Furman v. Georgia, Jackson v. Georgia, and Branch v. Texas, collectively (Zimring and Hawkins 1986, p. 30) . Of the executions since 1977, over 75 percent have occurred in the South. Researchers exploit the variation in the frequency of executions both in the states and over time to distinguish capital punishment's eff ect on murders from other infl uences. Ehrlich's fi nding triggered an avalanche of econometric analyses of capital punishment and deterrence. The papers that immediately followed Ehrlich use his original data (national time-series for 1933-69 or statelevel cross-section data for 1940 and 1950) and variants of his econometric model. The results were mixed. Many fi nd that capital punishment has a deterrent eff ect, but others do not. For example, using Ehrlich's data, the following fi nd a deterrent eff ect: Yunker (1976) , Cloninger (1977) , and Ehrlich and Gibbons (1977) . In contrast, Bowers and Pierce (1975) , Passel and Taylor (1977) , and Hoenack and Weiler (1980) fi nd no deterrence when they use the same data with alternative specifi cations. Similarly, McAleer and Veall (1989) , Leamer (1983), and McManus (1985) fi nd no deterrent eff ect when diff erent variables are included over the same sample period. Finally, Black and Orsagh (1978) obtain mixed results depending on which cross-section year they use.
Early empirical studies
In the late 1980s and 1990s, a second generation of econometric studies extended Ehrlich's national time-series data or used more recent crosssectional data. As before, some of the papers fi nd deterrence while others do not. For example, Layson (1985) and Cover and Thistle (1988) use an extension of Ehrlich's national time-series data, covering up to 1977. Although Layson fi nds a signifi cant deterrent eff ect of executions, Cover and Thistle correct for data fl aws -non-stationarity -and fi nd no deterrent eff ect. Chressanthis (1989) employs national time-series data covering 1966 through 1985 and fi nds a deterrent eff ect. In contrast, Grogger (1990) uses daily data for California during 1960-63 and fi nds no deterrent eff ect.
Most of the early studies, both the fi rst wave and the second generation, use the same types of data: either national time-series or cross-section data. However, these aggregated data have limitations. Analyses of national time-series data may suff er from aggregation bias; whenever several states are grouped together, changes in the murder rates of one state within the group may dilute opposite changes in the murder rates of another state. Likewise, cross-sectional data do not allow for fi xed-eff ects estimation to control for jurisdiction-specifi c characteristics that could be related to murder. Moreover, both time-series and cross-section data have few observations, which may produce spurious results or make strong statistical conclusions impossible.
Noting these possible limitations, several authors (Cameron, 1994; Avio, 1998) and a specially convened National Academy of Sciences panel called for new research using more disaggregated data, and, ideally, panel data.
Recent empirical studies
Since the mid-1990s, researchers have conducted studies that attempt to fi x fl aws in the earlier studies. Most recent studies have overcome many of the fundamental problems associated with national time-series and cross-section data by using panel data. The panel data that are normally used are a combination of time-series and cross-section data, looking at the experiences of each of many states or counties over time. Use of panel data often enables researchers to estimate any deterrent eff ect more precisely because panel data produces more observations, allows fi xed-eff ects estimations to control for important jurisdictional diff erences among US states or counties, and minimizes aggregation bias.
Many papers have recently been published in economics journals, law and economics journals, and law reviews. The methodology of many of the recent empirical studies resembles other empirical studies of crime. The new studies typically measure capital punishment's eff ect by estimating a murder supply equation that has some measure of murders as the dependent variable. Independent variables include the relevant capital punishment variables, along with a host of other control variables that typically include economic, demographic, political, and law enforcement variables. Moreover, most of the panel data studies include time and state fi xed eff ects that both control for any factors that aff ect all states but vary over time and control for any unobservable variables that systematically diff er among states.
Many of the estimations address the potentially endogenous relationship between executions and murders; it is conceivable not only that the number of executions could aff ect the number of murders, but also that more murders could cause governments to respond to a public outcry for more executions. Accordingly, scholars often estimate a system of equations to minimize potential bias.
In the following review of the recent empirical studies, I group articles by their primary focus.
Testing for deterrence
Many of the recent papers focus on whether capital punishment deters crime. In contrast to earlier papers, the recent papers use both new datasets that off er more disaggregated data and more sophisticated empirical methods.
In the earliest of the recent papers, Brumm and Cloninger (1996) use cross-sectional data covering 58 cities in 1985 to test for a deterrent eff ect. They estimate a covariance structure model in which the perceived risk of punishment is treated as an endogenous latent variable, with two measures of sanctions as its indicators. Their results provide support for the deterrence hypothesis: they fi nd that the perceived risk of punishment, including the probability of execution, is negatively and signifi cantly correlated with the homicide rate.
A paper by Dezhbakhsh et al. (2003) takes a diff erent approach. It examines whether deterrence exists using county-level panel data from 3,054 US counties over the period 1977 to 1996. This is the only study to use county-level data, signifi cantly increasing the number of observations and allowing the researchers to control for the demographic, economic, and jurisdictional diff erences among US counties that can aff ect murder rates. The estimation of a simultaneous-equations system to control for endogeneity between murders and executions produced results supporting the deterrence hypothesis; both death row sentences and the executions themselves are associated with decreases in the murder rate. Moreover, the results are robust to many diff erent ways of performing the statistical analysis.
In another study of the deterrent eff ect, Mocan and Gittings (2003) use state-level panel data from 1977 to 1997 to examine the relationship among executions, commutation and other removals from death row, and murder. Controlling for a variety of state-level characteristics in a series of estimations, their results strongly support the deterrence hypothesis. The fi ndings suggest that each additional execution decreases homicides by about fi ve, and that both commuting death-row prisoners' sentences and removing them from death row cause more murders. Specifi cally, each commutation results in approximately fi ve extra murders and each removal from death row generates one additional murder. Moreover, further supporting their conclusions, they fi nd that executions, commutations, and removals have no impact on other crime rates. Their results are robust to a series of alternative specifi cations.
Another recent paper by Katz et al. (2003) uses state-level panel data covering the period 1950 to 1990. Although their primary focus is on the relationship between prison conditions and crime rates, they also test for a relationship between the execution rate and murder rates. They fi nd only limited evidence of a deterrent eff ect: some specifi cations show no relationship between murders and executions, but other estimations do indicate a deterrent eff ect.
Similarly, Lott and Landes (1999) use state-level panel data from 1977 to 1995 to examine whether right-to-carry concealed handgun laws deter multiple-victim public shootings. Included in their analysis are tests of the deterrent eff ect of executions on murder. The authors fi nd that right-tocarry concealed handgun laws do result in fewer multiple-victim public shootings. They also fi nd that executions have a signifi cant deterrent eff ect on the overall murder rate. Specifi cally, a 1 percent increase in the execution rate is associated with a 7 percent decline in the overall murder rate.
Zimmerman (2004) 
The impact of moratoriums
Other papers have attempted to isolate the deterrent eff ect from other factors aff ecting murders by examining state and federal moratoriums on executions. Many factors that aff ect crime -for example, law enforcement, judicial, demographic, and economic variables -change only slightly over a short period of time. Therefore, changes in a state's murder rate quickly following a change in its death penalty law are likely the result of the legal change. Cloninger and Marchesini (2001) exploit Texas's unoffi cial moratorium on executions during 1996 to analyze both the moratorium's eff ect on murder rates and the eff ect on murder rates of ending the moratorium. They conduct a portfolio analysis that is similar to the event-study methodology used in the fi nancial literature. They fi nd both that the moratorium appears to have caused additional homicides and that murder rates signifi cantly decreased after the moratorium was lifted.
Cloninger and Marchesini (2006) apply a similar methodology to explore the impact of Illinois's unoffi cial moratorium on executions in 2000 and the commutation of all death sentences in the state in 2003. They fi nd that these two actions substantially increased Illinois's homicide rate. Specifi cally, they estimate that there were 150 additional homicides in Illinois during the years immediately following these two events Similarly, Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd (2006) test for deterrence by exploiting the natural experiment off ered by the moratorium on executions in all states from 1972-6 resulting from the US Supreme Court's decisions. They use a state-level panel dataset from 1960-2000 that includes data from before, during, and after the moratorium. Comparisons of murder rates before and after the moratorium reveal that about 91 percent of states experienced an increase in murder rates after they suspended the death penalty, and about 70 percent of states experienced decreases in murder rates after reinstating the death penalty. Moreover, regression analyses that disentangle the impact of the moratorium on murders from the impact of executions on murders also support the existence of deterrence. The results suggest that the moratorium was associated with increases in murders, while executions are associated with decreases in murders.
Variations of the murder-execution relationship
A group of studies have extended the basic deterrence studies and focused on the details of the relationship between murders and executions. Several studies have focused on which execution method provides the most eff ective deterrent, and other studies have examined the types of murders that are deterred. Ekelund et al. (2006) use state-level panel data for the period 1995-99 to explore the relationship between executions, single murders, and multiple murders. They fi nd that executions strongly deter single murders. Moreover, they fi nd that executions by electrocution are associated with greater reductions in murders than executions by lethal injection. In contrast, they fi nd that executions have no statistically signifi cant impact on multiple murders, suggesting that these murders are not deterrable.
In another analysis of which execution methods have the strongest deterrent eff ects, Zimmerman (2006) employs state-level panel data from 1978-2000. His results suggest that the deterrent eff ect of capital punishment is driven primarily by executions conducted by electrocution, as these executions are associated with signifi cant decreases in murder rates. In contrast, none of the other four methods of execution has a statistically signifi cant impact on murder rates.
Shepherd (2004) uses state-level, monthly panel data from 1977-99 to examine both the types of murders deterred by capital punishment and the impact on deterrence of execution delays. Despite beliefs that certain types of murder are not deterrable because they are products of uncontrollable rage, this study's empirical analysis indicates that the combination of death row sentences and executions is associated with decreases in all types of murders: murders between intimates, acquaintances, and strangers, crimeof-passion murders and murders committed during other felonies, and murders of both African-American and white people. Moreover, the results also suggest that shorter waits on death row increase deterrence. The results indicate that, on average, a 2.75-year reduction in the death-row wait before each execution is associated with the deterrence of one extra murder. Fagan et al. (2007) explore the impact of capital punishment on a subset of murders in Texas: homicides that have been defi ned statutorily as death eligible. Using state-level panel data over the years 1976-2003, they found no evidence of a deterrent eff ect on such murders.
Sensitivity analysis
As most of the recent papers have found some evidence of deterrence, they have generated substantial interest in the sensitivity of the deterrence fi ndings. In addition to the extensive sensitivity analyses that appear in several of the papers themselves, other recent papers have focused either on the robustness of previous studies' results or on the nuances of capital punishment's deterrent eff ect. These papers focus on deterrence fi ndings in both early and recent papers.
The fi rst of the recent sensitivity analyses was Ehrlich and Liu (1999) , which tested the robustness of Ehrlich's deterrence fi ndings from the 1970s. Using Ehrlich's original state-level, cross-section data from 1940 and 1950, the paper tests for improper functional form, heteroscedasticity, heterogeneity, measurement errors, simultaneity, and contemporaneous correlation. All of the results support the deterrence hypothesis.
Liu (2004) investigates the endogenous nature of states' decisions to enact death penalty laws, and the resulting selection bias in many econometric models. He presents a theoretical model that shows that the eff ect of deterrent variables will diff er between states with and without death penalty laws, and proposes an econometric model that will control for this selection bias. Using Ehrlich's original state-level, cross-section data, a system of equations, and switching regression techniques to minimize simultaneity, the results confi rm the deterrent fi ndings of Ehrlich's earlier study. The results are also consistent across several alternative specifi cations. Narayan and Smyth (2006) explores whether the results of early studies that used national time-series data are spurious because they did not account for the data's stationarity properties. Using national-level timeseries data over the years 1965-2001, they employ a cointegration and error-correction framework that allows estimation of both the short-run and long-run elasticities between capital punishment and murder. They fi nd only limited support for the deterrence hypothesis. In both the short run and the long run, only the probability of receiving a death sentence explains national variations in the homicide rate; the probability of execution is statistically insignifi cant in all but a few specifi cations. Fagan (2006) addresses the reliability of both early and recent studies. After discussing several technical and conceptual problems that could be present in all early deterrence studies, he undertakes his own sensitivity analysis of the estimation in a recent paper, Mocan and Gittings (2003) . Although he is able to replicate their results perfectly, he fi nds that the results do not hold when he performs the same analysis on diff erent data sources, excludes Texas from the estimation, includes diff erent variables, or uses alternate functional forms and econometric methods. He concludes that the impact of capital punishment on murders is still uncertain.
Berk (2005) explores whether the small number of executions in most states and years infl uences the earlier deterrence fi ndings. He asserts that, because the majority of states perform few, if any, executions each year, any deterrent eff ect must be driven by a few individual states and years. To confi rm this, he examines the 1977-97 state-level, panel data from Mocan and Gittings (2003) to compare the relationship between murders and executions when a state has very few executions with when there are several executions. He fi nds that the negative relationship between executions and murders exists only when there are several executions in a state each year. In addition, when he eliminates from the data states such as Texas with especially large numbers of executions, he fi nds no evidence of deterrence. Shepherd (2005) also recognizes the relevance of state-specifi c deterrence, in the fi rst study to measure the diff erent deterrent eff ects among the US states. Using three diff erent datasets -annual county-level data from 1977-96, annual state-level data from 1960-2000, and monthly state-level data from 1977-99 -the paper fi nds that the impact of executions diff ers substantially among US states. Executions deter murders in some states, but actually increase murders in many others. In general, a deterrent eff ect exists only in the few states with a large number of executions since the end of the 1970s Supreme Court moratorium. In contrast, in the many states with few executions since the moratorium, executions generally increase the number of murders or have no signifi cant impact. Shepherd concludes that, in most states, executions do not deter crime, but instead induce additional murders.
A later study by Donohue and Wolfers (2005) also analyzes the state-bystate variation in capital punishment's deterrent eff ect and concludes that there is no deterrent eff ect in most states. In addition, this study critiques the empirical analyses of several previous papers. Although Donohue and Wolfers fi nd that they were able to replicate the results from the previous papers perfectly, they fi nd that some of the previous results are not robust to alternative specifi cations, including diff erent sample periods, comparison groups, control variables, functional forms, or estimators. They assert that executions are so rare that it is impossible reliably to distinguish their eff ect on the murder rate from the eff ects of the other factors that infl uence murder rates. They therefore conclude that whether capital punishment deters murder is still an unanswered question.
Responses to criticisms
Several of the authors whose work was challenged by Donohue and Wolfers (2005) have written responses. Mocan and Gittings (2006) argue that Donohue's and Wolfers's re-analysis of their original 2003 article (Mocan and Gittings 2003) errs by assuming that an execution or commutation occurs in the same year that a prisoner receives his death sentence. Mocan and Gittings perform the same sensitivity analyses that Donohue and Wolfers used to critique their paper, but with an econometric model that allows for a several-year lag between death sentences and executions or commutations. They fi nd that the results of these sensitivity analyses confi rm their earlier fi ndings that deterrence exists.
Similarly, Dezhbakhsh and Rubin (2007) respond to Donohue's and Wolfers's criticisms of two of their previous papers (Dezhbakhsh et al., 2003; Dezbakhsh and Shepherd, 2006 Dezhbakhsh et al. (2003) .
Dezhbakhsh and Rubin also repeat all of the sensitivity analyses that Donohue and Wolfers used to challenge the 2006 study (Dezbakhsh and Shepherd 2006 ). Donohue and Wolfers reported the results for only a subset of the sensitivity analyses, most of which showed no deterrent eff ect. In contrast, Dezhbakhsh and Rubin report the results from all 80 alternative specifi cations that Donohue and Wolfers discuss, fi nding that almost 75 percent of the results provide statistically signifi cant evidence of a deterrent eff ect.
Cloninger and Marchesini (2007) is also a brief response to Donohue and Wolfers. The paper claims that the homicide measure that Donohue and Wolfers used to critique the portfolio analysis in the authors' previous two papers (Cloninger and Marchesini, 2001; Cloninger and Marchesini, 2006) is invalid (Cloninger and Marchesini, 2007, p. 6 ).
Current state of the literature
Most recent empirical studies of capital punishment fi nd evidence supporting the deterrence hypothesis. However, a few recent studies have raised questions about the sensitivity of some of the previous results. Other recent research also shows that deterrence does not occur in many states and for many types of executions. Indeed, in a substantial number of states, executions may instead increase crime.
Because fi ndings on deterrence continue to evolve, it is likely that future research will continue to focus on the issue. Regardless of the state of the literature on deterrence, it should be recognized that even were there a strong, consistent deterrent eff ect, this would appropriately contribute only a small piece to the puzzle of whether the US should join the rest of the Western world in abolishing the death penalty. Issues of morality, justice, constitutionality, racial and gender discrimination, and arbitrariness are equally important considerations.
